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ABSTRACT: The crisis that especially since the 2008 has shown the deep weakness of the capitalistic eco-
nomic model induces to reflect on the role of the radical left parties and on their capacity to propose al-
ternative policies, interpreting the citizens’ demands.  Starting from these premises this article analyses 
three parties of the radical left party family- United Left, Left Freedom and Ecology and Syriza-  that act 
respectively in Spain, Italy and Greece, three of the European democracies most affected by the social 
consequences of the crisis. The article proposes a diachronic comparison of the three parties’ policy pro-
posals, organizational model and strategies in order to explain their greater or lesser ability to attract con-
sensus in the last years. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Faced with the economic crisis that in recent years has involved almost all European 
countries, most of the governments of advanced democracies, whether they are cen-
tre-right or centre-left, have responded by introducing austerity policies aimed to 
maintain an economic model that, more than in the past, has shown profound weak-
nesses. In this context what has been the reaction of the radical left parties? From a 
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theoretical point of view precisely radical left parties (RLPs) should be among those po-
litical forces able to offer an economic and social programme alternative to the con-
temporary and diffused austerity trend. Indeed «they reject the underlying socio-
economic structures of contemporary capitalism and its values and practices; they ad-
vocate alternative economic and power structures involving a major redistribution of 
resources from existing political elites» and finally they identify «the economic inequal-
ity as the basis of existing political and social arrangements» espousing «collective eco-
nomic and social rights as their principal agenda» (March 2011, 8-9). Consequently, in 
conjunction of one of the most deep economic crisis of capitalism, have RLPs been able 
to intercept from the society the requests of social and economic equality expressed 
very clearly through large and widespread mobilizations in many European countries?  
In order to answer these questions, we propose a comparison of the three parties 
belonging to the radical left,  United Left (Izquierda Unida, IU), Left, Ecology and Free-
dom (Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà, SEL) and Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza), respec-
tively active in Spain, Italy and Greece, some of the European democracies most affect-
ed by the consequences of the economic crisis. In the light of the recent economic de-
cline and the growing public distrust in politics in all three democracies, a diachronic 
comparison is proposed, through the party documents and the sectorial literature, of 
policy proposals, organizational characteristics and strategies adopted by political par-
ties. The main research aim is to identify the similarities and the differences between 
the three parties that explain their different electoral trend in the last years: the rapid 
political success of Syriza, the electoral recovery of IU and the progressive marginaliza-
tion of SEL. 
 
 
2. Mediterranean Democracies between economic crisis and distrust in poli-
tics 
 
Greece, Spain and Italy are among those European countries most affected by the 
consequences of the international economic crisis started in 20081. In the three de-
mocracies the crisis has taken on different characteristics and variable intensities de-
pending both on their domestic political and structural economic characteristics and on 
the period considered.  
 
1 In this study we did not consider the case of Portugal mainly because in this country there are not recent relevant 
changes in relation to the radical left. 
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In Greece the economic decline started since the 2008, after a decade characterized 
by 3.9% average annual increase of GDP and a progressive reduction of the official un-
employment rate (from 12% in 1999 to 8.3% in 2007) (Pagoulatos and Triantopoulos 
2009, 36). At the end of 2009, with the intensification of the financial crisis and after 
the revelation of the real condition of the national public finances (the budget deficit 
was 15.7% decisively higher than that declared by the previous Greek government and 
the national debt was over 112% of GDP) Greece suffered the downgrading of its sov-
ereign credit rating to junk status (Bosco and Verney 2012; Lavdas, Litsas and Skiadas 
2013). In 2011, after the intervention of the Troika (European Commission, European 
Central Bank and International Monetary Fund) and the consequent austerity mea-
sures, Greece continued to experience negative growth (-7.1%); the unemployment 
rate was 17.9%, becoming 27.5% in 2013; the public debt rose up to 170.6% of GDP 
and, after a temporary reduction in 2012, it reached 174.9% of GDP in 2013; between 
2011-2013 the budget deficit was over 8.5% of GDP (Eurostat data).    
From 1995 to 2007 also the Spanish economy was growing registering 3.6% average 
annual increase of GDP (Field and Botti 2013, 4). However in 2009, with the conver-
gence of the international economic crisis and the real estate market bubble-burst, the 
GDP dropped to -3.8% and, despite a slight recovery in 2011, it remained negative in 
the next two years. Similarly the unemployment rate passed from 8.2% in 2007 to 
21.4% in 2011 and 26.1% in 2013. The budget deficit as a percentage of GDP was 4.5% 
in 2008, reached its peak in 2009 (11.2%), decreasing slightly in the next two years and 
growing up to 10.3% in 2012. The public debt passed from 40.2% of GDP in 2008 to 
92.1% of GDP in 2013 (Eurostat data).      
Finally Italy, although being the fourth largest economy in the EU, in the decade pri-
or to 2008 had an annual average growth of 1.5%. With the beginning of the crisis, the 
economy slowed down further, recovering temporarily in 2010 (1.7% of GDP) (Verney 
and Bosco 2013, 400-401). However the fear of a Greek default evidenced the Italian 
unresolved problem of public debt (from 2007 to 2012 it went from 103.3% of GDP to 
127% of GDP), making more urgent structural reforms and austerity measures and pre-
vented expansive policies necessary to counteract the negative effects on the real 
economy (Bosco and Verney 2012). In 2012 the economy shrank by 2.5% and in 2013 
by 1.9, while the unemployment rate went from 6.7% in 2008 to 12.2% in 2013 (Euro-
stat data).  
Despite the necessary differentiations, in all three democracies the economic and 
social difficulties have not been without consequences on the domestic political dy-
namics and party systems. Indeed, according to the literature on «economic voting», 
voters evaluate in retrospect the government parties, punishing them when the econ-
Partecipazione e conflitto, 8(1) 2015: 215-240, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v8i1p215 
  
218 
 
omy and their previous performance in this sector are perceived as negative (Kramer 
1983; Lewis Beck and Stegmaier 2007). More generally, citizens’ perception of both 
economic decline and lack of political responsiveness to the social and economic con-
sequences can also contribute to reduce the public institutional trust (Torcal 2014), 
widening the distance between citizens and representatives and threatening, in the 
most extreme cases, the legitimacy of the political and economic system (Roth, Nowak 
Lehemann and Otter 2011). Disaffected voters may support the established opposition 
party, nurture resentment against all mainstream parties and turn to populist, periph-
eral or radical challengers, or still they may protest through no institutional channels, 
external to the electoral arena (Kriesi 2012, 519).  
In all three democracies the consequences on political dynamics became manifest in 
2011 with the worsening of the crisis: in Spain the early elections of 2011 decreed the 
crushing defeat of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) in favour of the Popular 
Party (PP), the main opposition party; in Italy and Greece, the extreme weakness of the 
government majority and the growing impatience of the public opinion led to the for-
mation of new governments, supported by alternative majorities already present in 
their respective Parliaments (Bosco and Verney 2012).  
In the three countries between 2008 and 2013 the citizens' trust in government de-
clined sharply: in Spain it went from 55% to 8%; in Greece it dropped from 34% to 9%, 
with an increase in 2009 (44%), and in Italy from 15% to 11%, increasing temporary to 
25% in 2009-2010. In the previous five years in Spain and Greece the percentage had 
never been lower than 40%, while in Italy it had oscillated between 34% and 23%. Fur-
thermore also the low confidence of Spaniards, Greeks and Italians in national parties 
recently sloped down further: in Greece it went from 25% of 2006 to 17% in 2008 and 
4% in 2013; In Italy it passed from 26% in 2006 to 13% in 2008 and 7% in 2013; in Spain 
the rate was traditionally higher than in the other two countries (with a peak of 40% in 
2008) but it also collapsed to 5% in 2013 (EB series 2003-2013). In general, observing 
the data on the citizens’ satisfaction with democracy in the three countries during the 
last decade (Fig. 1), it is possible to see a common significant decline since the last few 
years. In Spain and Greece it started since 2009 and in Italy, where the percentage was 
already lower, shortly after. Since 2011 this dissatisfaction has led to the emergence of 
large and intense protests, the increase of abstention, or the formation of new political 
forces, often anti-party and sometimes characterized by extreme right and racist ideol-
ogy (Bosco and Verney 2012). 
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Fig. 1 Satisfaction with democracy in Greece, Spain and Italy 2001-2013 
 
Source: Eurobarometer series 
 
If the far-right parties have been and continue to be extensively studied, less atten-
tion has been devoted to the analysis of those belonging to the radical left. The RLPs 
pursue systemic change of capitalism and, although often labelled by their political op-
ponents as extremist forces, accept the rules of representative democracy, participat-
ing in electoral contests and appearing often in coalition with the centre-left political 
forces. At the same time they are interpreters of a broader concept of direct democra-
cy based on participation and inclusion of marginalized social groups within the politi-
cal system. RLPs oppose the neo-liberal economic model of development, proposing a 
system where the political intervention is aimed to limit the social inequalities pro-
duced by the market and where the redistribution of resources is necessary and inevi-
table (March 2008, 3). They are contrary to the processes of globalization, express res-
ervations about European integration focused solely on the unification of markets, and 
often politicize post-materialistic themes (Olsen, Kob and Hough 2010, 7). In front of 
one of the most intense crises of capitalism that has taken place in the course of histo-
ry, were these parties able to intercept the protest and dissatisfaction of citizens by in-
creasing their political consensus? In order to answer this question, this article will fo-
cus on the analysis of three RLPs: United Left (IU) in Spain, SYRIZA in Greece and Left, 
Ecology and Freedom (SEL) in Italy. 
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3. The radical left in times of crisis 
 
IU, SYRIZA and SEL have solid leftish political traditions, but they have established 
themselves as autonomous organizations just recently and in different periods. IU 
emerged in 1986 as a coalition of parties, with a dominant component of the old 
Communist Party of Spain (PCE) (Stefuriuc and Verge, 2008); SYRIZA was born in 2004, 
also as an alliance between several parties led by the Coalition of the Left, ecology and 
social movements (SYN), and then transformed in 2013 in a unitary party (Tsakatika 
and Eleftheriou, 2013); SEL established itself in 2009 from the split of the former Party 
of Communist Refoundation (PRC) (Bordandini 2013a).  
Despite the obvious differences, however, all three parties converge in terms of ide-
ology and political programmes, indicating social justice, equality, freedom, anti-
capitalism, feminism and environmentalism as their core principles and themes. In the 
European elections of 2014 they were gathered around a political platform in support 
of the candidacy for President of the European Commission Alexis Tzipras, leader of 
SYRIZA, opposing the austerity policies and what they termed as the resulting «regres-
sion of democracy» at the European and domestic level. They supported the need to 
promote an alternative development based on social equality, the centrality of work, 
the ecological conversion of production, the introduction of new immigration policies 
and the peaceful resolution of international conflicts (European Left  2014). 
 From a theoretical point of view the three parties should benefit in terms of political 
consensus from the economic situation. In fact, one of the main factors in determining 
the support for RLPs, together with those of a socio-demographic and ideological ori-
entation, is precisely the considerations of the electorate about the economic policies. 
According to the thesis of the «crisis of modernization» they are part of those political 
forces capable of intercepting the protest arising from the uncertainties produced by 
the post-industrial economy and globalization. Moreover, it is in conjunction with diffi-
cult economic situations and the consequent intensification of public fears of social in-
equality that these parties tend to establish and expand their political support (March 
2008; Bowyer and Vail 2011; March and Rommerskirchen 2015). As can be seen in Ta-
ble 1, in recent years Spanish, Italian and Greek citizens have expressed particular con-
cern about the economic situation and the unemployment rate in their respective 
states.  
Furthermore in all three countries, almost the entire population (the percentages 
recorded between 2011 and 2014, almost always exceed 90%) defined as totally nega-
tive the national economic situation (Standard Eurobarometer 2011-2014). Despite 
this, observing the electoral performance of the three parties in the last few years 
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there is no consistent trend (Tab 2-4). Only SYRIZA has experienced considerable suc-
cess, becoming the second national political force with 26.9% of the vote in 2012 Greek 
elections and the first Greek party at the 2014 European elections obtaining 21.9% of 
the vote. The situation in the other two cases seems to be very different. IU, after a 
long period of decline, in the general election of 2011 got 6.9% of the vote compared 
to 3.8% in 2008, while SEL, which initially appeared to be a political force able to grow 
rapidly, in the Italian elections of 2013 received only 3.2% of the vote. Both IU and SEL 
showed in the recent European consultations significantly lower levels of consensus 
towards their Greek ally. In fact, the formation of Izquierda Plural made up by IU and 
other minor parties got 10% of the vote, while the Tsipras List in Italy, supported by 
SEL, the PRC and by civil society movements and organizations arrived at 4%. 
It would seem that of the three parties, only SYRIZA and partly IU (even if the results 
were much more limited) have been able to capitalize on the "opportunities" arising 
from a growing social dissatisfaction generated by one of the worst crises of the capi-
talist economic system. How can we explain these differences? Are there other factors 
that help to explain the success or failure of the three political parties at this stage? In 
order to answer these questions, we propose a diachronic comparison of the evolution 
of the three cases, which highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the parties them-
selves, as well as those systemic and electoral factors that contributed to their success 
or conversely, to their decline. 
 
Tab. 1 The two main concerns of Greek, Spanish and Italian citizens 
 
What do you think are the two most important issues facing (our) country at the moment?   
 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
 E.  U. E.  U. E.  U. E.  U. E. U. E. U. E. U. E. U E. U. 
GR 46 60 52 65 55 58 75 61 68 53 60 46 51 35 33 42 41 56 
ES 36 78 48 74 55 78 65 81 60 79 55 66 44 45 9 21 10 18 
I 37 60 42 56 45 51 61 47 40 48 41 45 39 27 25 27 33 30 
*percentual data 
Source: Eurobarometer series 
 
Tab.2 IU results at the general and European elections 
 
General Elections Votes % Seats European elections Votes%  Seats 
1986 4.6 7 1987 5.2 3 
1989 9.1 17 1989 6.1 4 
1993 9.6 18 1994 13.4 9 
1996 10.5 21 1999 5.8 4 
2000 5.4 8 2004 4.1 2 
2004 4.9 5 2009 3.7 2 
2008 3.8 2 2014 10.0 6 
2011 6.9 11    
Source: Ministerio del Interior 
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Tab. 3 RC and SEL results at the general and European elections 
 
General Elections Votes % Seats European elections Votes%  Seats 
1992 5.6 35 1994 6.1 5 
1994 6.0 39 1999 4.3 4 
1996 8.6 35 2004 6.1 5 
2001 5.0 11 2009 3.1 0 
2006 5.8 41 2014 4.0 3 
2008 3.1 -    
2013 3.2 37    
Source: Ministero dell’Interno. Notes: The 1992-2006 general election and 1994-2004 European election results refer to 
RC. The 2008 general election results refer to the Rainbow Left coalition. The 2009 and 2014 European election results 
refer respectively to Left and Freedom and to the list The other Europe with Tsipras. 
 
Tab. 4 SYN/Syriza results at the general and European elections 
 
General Elections Votes % Seats European Elections Votes % Seats 
1993 2.9 0 1994 6.3 2 
1996 5.1 10 1999 5.2 2 
2000 3.2 6 2004 4.1 1 
2004 3.3 6 2009 4.7 1 
2007 5 14 2014 21.9 6 
2009 4.6 13    
2012 (M) 16.8 52    
2012 (G) 26.9 71    
Source: Greek Minister of Interior 
Notes: The 1993, 1996, 2000 general and 1994, 1999 European election results refer to SYN. 
 
 
3.1  Theoretical and analytical overview 
 
There are several «organizational problems» that the parties, as groups more or less 
structured and stable, have to face if they want to survive and adapt to the changing 
environment in which they act. These problems were classified by Raniolo (2013) in 
terms of: the collective action problem or internal participation, which refers to the 
role of the membership, and relationships between leaders and members; the problem 
of coordination or institutionalization, which concerns the structure of the organization 
and the conformation of the dominant coalition; the problem of mobilization of re-
sources and the autonomy of the organization; the strategic problem and the action 
that is aimed at research of the primary objectives - votes, office and policy - and rela-
tions with the outside environment. It is about the way the parties meet these organi-
zational challenges and the consequences resulting from it, often unintended, that it is 
possible to define the identity, organization and strategic characteristics of the parties 
themselves, understanding their most significant changes that occur in time. With re-
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gard to this issue, according to March (2008), the most successful RLPs are those which 
have dealt with the «organizational problems», changing in line with the transfor-
mations recently occurred in the Western democracies. In particular, one of the factors 
that appears to affect their success is the ability to resize the references to the doctrine 
and ideological slogans, incorporating those groups and organizations united mainly by 
the opposition to neo-liberalism. In these cases, the parties present themselves as 
«campaigning» organizations and tend to include in their speeches new issues such as, 
for example, environmentalism and feminism. Moreover, their leaders are well away 
from the «dogmatic 'democratically centralised' personalities of the traditional com-
munist parties» and they rather appear «media-savvy performers» with charismatic 
aspects (March 2008, 10). In addition, these parties are by definition closely related to 
the concept of representation and social integration. Therefore, those RLPs which are 
away from the logic of electoralist parties, tend to strengthen their internal participa-
tory ties, encouraging practices of democracy and participation in their organizations, 
and opening up to society through the establishment of «environmental linkages» with 
the movements and other organizations, tend to be more successful (Tsakatika and 
Eleftheriou, 2013, 2; Ramiro and Verge, 2013, 42; Bordandini 2013b, 22). 
In addition to the strict organizational issues, the ability to deal with the «strategic 
problem» (Raniolo 2013) is essential to each party. Their ability to solve this problem, 
however, depends not only on their strategies, but also on the competitive environ-
ment and their direct competitors. In particular, some studies have shown as a favour-
able factor to the emergence and consolidation of the RLPs the absence of direct pro-
test party competitors and the existence of party systems in which the main parties of 
the centre-left and centre-right converge. The moderation of the social-democratic 
parties, their distance from social issues and their progressive similarity with the forces 
of the centre-right can indeed create a free space on the left (March 2008). In the latter 
case, it is exactly those RLPs that adopt «strategies of opposition» (Panebianco 1982) 
that benefit. 
It is starting from these theoretical premises, retracing the evolution of our three 
parties - IU, SEL and SYRIZA - that we are going to highlight their greater or lesser ca-
pacity to deal with organizational problems, losing or gaining consensus in a particular-
ly delicate phase of history. In order to understand why between the three parties only 
SYRIZA has been able to obtain a surprising result in the past European and political 
competitions, it is necessary to rebuild their stories, highlighting their "state of health" 
in recent years. The credibility of a party and therefore its attractiveness depends not 
only on the policy proposals (as outlined above for our three cases, the programmes 
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are quite similar), but also from its past, from what has been, from its original identity, 
from which aims it has pursued and the strategies that it has fielded. 
Of the three parties taken into account in this study, IU is the one that has the oldest 
history and perhaps even more problematic, SEL and SYRIZA have a much shorter story, 
but not less relevant. Precisely for this reason, we are going to focus the discussion on 
key issues related to organizational problems, comparing the organizational model and 
the leadership of the three parties, as well as their ability to establish links with organi-
zations and outside groups. 
To conclude, we are going to examine their strategies towards the primary objec-
tives (votes, office and policy) and their main competitors, in the light of the con-
straints of electoral and party systems, focusing particularly on the latest national and 
European competitions celebrated in conjunction with the economic crisis. 
 
 
4. Three Model in comparison 
 
4.1 United Left (1986 to 2014): network party prey to factionalism 
 
IU was born in 1986 as an electoral coalition formed by the PCE and other minor left-
wing political forces as well as independent adherents. At the first party conference in 
1989 IU proposed itself as «a social and political movement» aimed at encouraging the 
participation of both political forces and citizens (IU 1989, 11). At the same time it was 
endowed with an organizational structure made up of different organs hierarchically 
ordered - Federal Assembly, Federal Policy Conference, Federal Policy Commission and 
the Presidency- and of territorial grassroots organizations as well as thematic working 
groups, the so-called áreas. Compared to 1986, in the first meeting, only three parties 
were present at national level - the PASOC (Party of Socialist Action), IR (Republican 
Left) and the PCE - to which had joined the group of independents. Until 1992, their 
presence in the organs of IU were organized according to a quota system (Ramiro 
2000). 
Although initially within IU there seemed to prevail a «cooperative factionalism» 
aimed to strengthen the organization and to achieve balance between the various in-
ternal forces, there would soon emerge a battle for power management and political 
and strategic guidance, progressing gradually towards a «competitive factionalism», 
sometimes tending to a «degenerative» one (Boucek 2009). In the early nineties the 
dominant coalition, which was polyarchic but dominated by the PCE, found itself torn 
between the so-called renovadores and conservadores in respect to several issues: the 
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possible dissolution of the PCE in favour of the institutionalization of IU, the level of 
radicalism policy proposals and the strategy to be adopted in respect to the PSOE 
(Bosco 2000; Ramiro Fernández 2006; Damiani 2013a). It was only after 1992 that an 
agreement was reached: the PCE yielded some features in favour of the institutionali-
zation of IU as a federation but not as a party; factions were allowed and the quota sys-
tem was substituted by proportional representation (Bosco 2000). The organizational 
model was similar to the party network, an organization with a centre but able to rec-
ognize a certain level of autonomy in local and regional units (Damiani 2013a). 
Despite the emergence of other internal conflicts, often linked to the political and 
electoral strategy, until the mid-nineties IU had recorded high acclaim (Tab. 2), espe-
cially thanks to the leader Anguita, the so-called califa rojo, a charismatic personality 
and widely appreciated by the electorate and civil society so much so as to receive bet-
ter evaluations than Gonzales and Aznar, then leaders respectively of the PSOE and PP 
(CIS Barometer 1994-1995). It was after 2000 that the differences would become more 
acute. The leadership of the PCE and IU found themselves divided about the election of 
the Anguita’s successor. The first was for the election of Francisco Frutos, in favour of a 
collective but centralized leadership formed by a dozen people representing the par-
ties. The second supported Gaspar Llamazares, oriented towards a post-communist 
and eco-socialist evolution and a decentralized organization (Del Alcazar 2000, 6-7). 
Following the victory of Llamazares, attested by just one vote, the phase of «asymmet-
rical bicefalia» started (Martínez Fuetes 2005): Llamazarez obtained the majority in IU 
but not in the PCE, while Frutos had the support of PCE but not by IU (Damiani, 2013a, 
9). In subsequent years, the PCE therefore acted in opposition to the dominant coali-
tion of IU (Ramiro and Verge, 2013, 46), extending its presence at the federal level and 
succeeding in 2008 to elect its exponent, Cayo Lara,  through a far from linear process 
(Gómez and Verge 2009). The internal differences would not vanish causing the with-
drawal of some prominent figures (Martín and Urquizu-Sancho 2012, 354) and in 2012 
Llamazares turned the faction Open Left into a real party like the PCE.  
In addition to factionalism, another problem of IU was the difficulties of ensuring ef-
fective internal participation. Firstly, the membership has always been low and fluctu-
ating (Tab. 5), secondly, the primaries, introduced in 1992, have been used in a discre-
tionary manner, remaining a widespread practice mostly at the local level and often in 
open opposition with the ruling class. Finally, the áreas grew very slowly, often with 
low participation, and the party’s decisions have been generally adopted through a 
top-down process (Ramiro and Verge 2013). 
We must recognize that IU, while not creating collateral organizations and losing the 
hegemony that the PCE had in the past towards the trade union and feminist move-
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ments, has always tried to establish informal links with the outside world, taking part in 
various social mobilizations. However, as evidenced by Ramiro and Verge (2013), these 
efforts, both for the internal problems of the party and other factors related to inter-
party competition, have almost never produced a return in terms of electoral support. 
Thus in 2008, following the disappointing results recorded in national elections (Tab. 
2), IU started a process of «re-foundation» aimed to strengthen participatory and envi-
ronmental linkages. The party attempted to embrace the Indignados protest that broke 
out in Spain in 2011, proposing to develop an «Alternative Program» open to all those 
who opposed the neo-liberal model and giving the chance to the movement to get par-
liamentary representation by participating directly in its electoral lists. Despite this, and 
although some studies have shown that in the elections of 2011, a high percentage of 
IU voters engaged in activities related to the movement (Cis n. 7711 quot. in Martìn 
and Urquizu-Sancho 2012, 356), in 2013 it was precisely the same movement that pub-
licly denounced the attempt of the parties and especially the IU to «cannibalise» the 
citizens' protest for electoral purposes (ecodiario2013). Finally the 2014 European elec-
tions seem to have set the new formation Podemos as political representative of the 
movement.  
 
Tab. 5 Membership United Left 1986-2012 
 
Year  Members enrolled 
1986 70.000 
1989 49.730 
1992 57.303 (44.775) 
1993 57.303 
1996 65.099 (34.704) 
1997 71.578 (35.000) 
1999 69.000 (26.553) 
2000 65.000 
2004 67.802 
2008 50.801 
2012 30.000 
*the data in parentheses refers to PCE membership 
Sources: Ramiro and Verge 2013, 46; Linz, Montero and Ruiz 2005. 
 
In conclusion, the history of IU is characterized by divisions, conflicts and difficulties 
in implementing its objectives and principles. These internal organizational factors, as 
recognized by IU itself (IU 2012), prevented the party to comply with its original ambi-
tion of acting as a social and political movement, limiting its capacity to establish solid 
links with society, attracting a wider consensus. 
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4.2 Left, Ecology and freedom (2009-2014): between movement party and personal 
party 
 
The origins of SEL date back to the defeat in the general elections of 2008 of the 
electoral cartel Rainbow Left that had collected all the forces of the Italian left - the 
Communist Refoundation, (RC), Italian Communists (PDCI),  Democratic Left (SD) - and 
the Greens, who presented themselves as an alternative to the left of the Democratic 
Party (PD) (De Luca, Pala and Sozzi 2014). The PD, after the failure of the 2006 coalition 
government together with RC, decided to participate at the 2008 elections avoiding po-
litical agreements with the radical left. The crushing defeat (Table 3), which established 
for the first time the absence in Parliament of all the RLPs, had led to the resignation of 
Bertinotti, leader of the RC, paving the way for his succession. The election as new par-
ty secretary of the orthodox Ferrero, pushed Nichi Vendola, until then the right arm of 
Bertinotti and member of one of the greatest RC factions, to leave the party and found 
the Movement for the Left. In view of the European elections of 2009 Vendola, togeth-
er with those who had abandoned the previous organizations, gave birth to the Left 
and Freedom, an electoral aggregation open to organizations, groups and movements 
to the left of the PD. This was none other than the direct precedent of SEL, born as a 
movement at the end of 2009, from the aggregation of minority force parties of RC, 
PDCI, Greens and DS, and turned into a party, structured with national organs (National 
Assembly, National Presidency and National Coordination), regional federation and ter-
ritorial and thematic circles, on the occasion of the first congress of 2010 (Bordandini 
2013b, 17-18).  
Despite the similarity with the structures of the traditional parties SEL was initially 
characterized by two features: a charismatic leadership and a similarity with the 
movement party (Damiani 2013b). The first congress sanctioned the election to Presi-
dent of Vendola who had played a key role in the process of aggregation of the various 
forces of the left, gaining some visibility thanks to the victory of the centre-left primary 
elections for the region of Puglia in both 2005 (when still militant in the RC) and in 
2010, when he was re-elected local governor. But what most helps to explain the cen-
trality of the leadership by Vendola has always been his communication strategy based 
on: the elaboration of a learned political discourse, inspired to social, ethical and liber-
tarian values and a project oriented to modernizing and unifying the left; the use of 
both the traditional tools of mass communication and the new social media, useful to 
establish direct links with his electorate  (Bordandini 2013b; Damiani 2013b).  
As well explained by Damiani (2013b), the process of «leaderalization» evident in 
the Italian domestic politics, especially in the period between 2009 and 2011, did bring 
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benefits to both the party and Vendola. According to opinion polls conducted in those 
years, Vendola gained high approval rating, especially among the younger population, 
above all for his charismatic leadership and the innovative character of his political ac-
tion (Demopolis Polls 2011, Ipsos 2011 quot. in Damiani 2013b, 315-316). Similarly in 
2010 47% of the national SEL delegates indicated the «charismatic leadership by Ven-
dola» as the most important feature of his own party, followed by 24% who classified 
this factor as the second distinguishing element, 61% of them attributed the success of 
their party to its leader (Bordandini 2013b, 37-38). In this case it can be argued, that 
rather than being in a situation in which the leader strategically uses the organizational 
resources,  we are faced with a case in which the leader is both a resource and «a cru-
cial factor in the genesis and action of a movement or a party» (Raniolo 2013, 98-99).  
The second factor that positively characterized SEL resided in some "movement" 
features of the party. It seemed an original formation in the Italian political landscape, 
becoming a tool to renew and connect organized and not-organized leftish forces in 
order to achieve a large project that, once completed, would have meant the demise of 
the party itself. As part of this project was the fundamental experiment of the so-called 
«Nichi factories», originally born as an evolution of the electoral committees to sup-
port the candidacy of the leader in the Puglia regional elections of 2010,  that quickly 
became, in different areas of the peninsula, open forums for discussion and an instru-
ment of mobilization from below, in which forms of direct communication via the web 
and social networks were predominant.  
As of the end of 2011 it is possible to identify the beginning of a second phase in the 
evolution of SEL. Between 2011 and 2012, the party, after winning the municipal pri-
mary coalition of the centre-left, was able to elect the mayors of three major Italian cit-
ies, Pisapia to the municipality of Milan, Zedda to that of Cagliari and Doria to Geno-
va's. It is also did not fail the commitment of the members of SEL in civil society, as for 
example during the mobilizations of the referendums in June 2011 on common goods 
and nuclear power.  
However, compared to the two previous years, SEL lost the innovative power, end-
ing the period of "effervescence" that had characterized the early stages: the number 
of members in 2010 stood at 45,530, in 2011 it dropped to 36,373 (Bordandini, 2013b, 
24) and in 2012 was 34,300 (Marchianò 2014). Secondly, the project of the Nichi facto-
ries was largely shelved, becoming these bodies places of top-down political choices 
communication (Damiani 2013b). Finally Vendola, while continuing to appear as a char-
ismatic leader, lost some of the initial visibility, unable to avoid the emergence of the 
first internal differences also linked to the organizational model to pursue. Indeed in 
2012 many SEL leading figures promoted the cause of encouraging more transparent 
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internal participation and in 2014 the internal divergences in the strategies of compet-
ing with the PD led to the withdrawal from the party by 12 deputies, including the 
group leader in the Chamber of Deputies, Migliore. 
 
 
4.3 SYRIZA (2004 to 2014): an organization open to the society 
 
Similarly to the other two parties SYRIZA was formally born in the occasion of the 
Greek elections of 2004 as a political and electoral coalition, consisting of SYN and a 
number of smaller parties and movements of the extra-parliamentary left: KOE (Com-
munist Organization of Greece), AKOA (Renewalist, and Communist Ecological Left), 
DEA (Internationalist Workers' Left), and several other smaller parties, as well as inde-
pendents (Eleftheriou 2009). It was formed as a party only in 2012, celebrating its first 
congress in 2013. 
However the history of SYRIZA cannot be treated separately from SYN's, that at least 
until 2012 held a dominant position within the coalition, being the larger party and 
from whence at least 80% of cadres, voters and activists of  SYRIZA came from (Tsakati-
ka and Eleftheriou, 2013). SYN was founded in 1992 mostly by members from the 
Greek Left (EAR), a large group of dissidents of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) and 
independents, small groups of the extra-parliamentary left and ecological movements, 
presenting itself as a pluralistic party in favour of democratic socialism and the new 
post-materialist issues (ibidem). The party was divided in two main factions: the first 
was for a left post-communist and pro-European orientations; the second showed a 
more left-radical tendency and a eurocritical attitude. The latter faction prevailed since 
the 2000s, establishing closer relations with the anti-globalization movements and pro-
tests and other left-wing parties, leading to the formation of SYRIZA, pursuing the main 
objective of «empowering the powerless» (Spourdalakis, 2013, 102; Eleftheriou 2009). 
Through SYRIZA, the party was able to stop the decline in membership and attract new 
younger adherents. In addition the youth organization SYN/Youth played a liason role 
between the party and the new social movements, actively participating in major mobi-
lization in Greece (anti-war movements, the Greek social Forum, European Social Fo-
rum) (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou, 2013). The involvement of the younger generation 
within SYN/SYRIZA became manifest when the thirty year old Alexis Tzipras was candi-
date in the municipal elections of Athens, then elected in 2007 to the presidency of 
SYN. Internal conflicts in SYN ended in 2010, when the Renewal Wing faction (later 
transformed into Democratic Left, DIMAR), that was against the maintenance of SYRIZA 
and the adopted party’s strategy, finally left the party, paving the way for the preva-
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lence of the leadership by Alexis Tzipras both within the party and SYRIZA (Ibidem 
2013).  
If in the past the decision adopted by SYN/SYRIZA to back the anti-authoritarian 
movement, founded in 2008 after the killing by the Greek police of the young student 
Alexis Grigoropoulos, may have penalized the party in the 2009 European elections, 
because the critics coming from other political forces and the national media (Spourda-
lakis, 2013, 103), more successful there has been its full involvement in the protest of 
the Indignant Greeks, which began in 2011. Participation and openness to society re-
warded SYRIZA, which in 2012 was transformed into a party, including SYN and many 
other parties and movements with Marxist, social-democratic and ecological orienta-
tions. Alexis Tsipras, who was elected party’s president in the 2013 first party’s con-
gress, gave great visibility to SYRIZA especially at the last European elections, when he 
launched the challenge to build a European left, carrying on an internationalist orienta-
tion and not solely on domestic issues.  
On the occasion of the first congress SYRIZA defined itself as: «a unified, democratic, 
multi-tendency mass party of the contemporary Left» aimed at the working and popu-
lar classes, the middle class of the towns and rural areas, open to the socially and eco-
nomically excluded. The party still continues to coordinate with social movements and 
the demands of the population in order to support a multi-tendency mass movement 
(SYRIZA 2013). The main party’s organ is the Central Commission, responsible for im-
plementing the policy established by Congress (held every three years) and to appoint 
the Political Secretariat. At the territorial level SYRIZA is divided into regional commit-
tees that have the task of coordinating the activities of the central and local units 
(SYRIZA founding charter, quot. in Borreca 2014, 13). Finally the youth organization, 
SYRIZA Youth, was also set up in order to give a voice to the younger generation, 
among the hardest hit by the adverse effects of the economic and social crisis. Ever 
since 2012 SYRIZA is approaching more closely to the trade union movement, succeed-
ing where SYN had failed (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou, 2013).  
In conclusion an element appears to be the main strength of SYRIZA: the ability to be 
in contact and involve the citizens and protest movements. Indeed, it is primarily from 
active participation in social mobilizations that the party which originated from SYN 
drew its strength, greatly extending the consensus of its predecessor (Table 4). Certain-
ly, it is still too early to say how SYRIZA will evolve, considering that as a party it is in its 
first phase of institutionalization. The main risk is that it will run into the same mistakes 
that incurred in IU and SEL, or even its predecessor SYN, that pluralism and dialogue 
between the various internal components become difficult to manage, highlighting 
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conflicts between those who advocate a strategy of more radical opposition and those 
more inclined to the compromise necessary to govern. 
 
5. The competitive strategies by IU, SEL and SYRIZA 
 
5.1 The decline of the PSOE and the slow ascent by IU 
 
The proportional electoral system, but the majoritarian outcomes and the prevailing 
bipolar mechanism of the Spanish party system, historically have not benefited IU. 
However, in its evolution, the party has also experienced moments of unexpected elec-
toral growth seizing its own space on the left. As can be seen from the data presented 
in the table 2, three phases can be identified in its electoral history: between 1986 and 
1996, IU progressively affirmed, reaching its historic peak between 1994 and 1996; 
from 1999 to 2009 the party registered a disastrous decline; finally from 2011 it started 
a slow electoral recovery (Damiani 2013a). These three phases correspond to two dif-
ferent strategies adopted by the party in the competition towards its main challenger, 
the PSOE. In the nineties, while the PSOE of Gonzalez was experiencing a lot of difficul-
ties, a strategy of opposition prevailed, expression of the theory «de las dos orillas», 
elaborated by the leader Anguita to indicate the need to oppose both the PSOE and PP, 
acting as a left alternative able to dominate the progressive space. In this period, the 
party recorded its best electoral results but was never able to overtake the PSOE (Hi-
dalgo-Redondo 2008; Damiani 2013a). However, at the end of the nineties its slow de-
cline began. On one hand, the opposition to the PSOE had paradoxically led IU to come 
closer to the position of the PP, on the other hand, the resignation of Anguita increased 
internal factionalism. So it was in 1999, after the disappointing European elections and 
in view of the national election of 2000, that IU attitude changed, starting to adopt a 
«strategy of cooperation» with the PSOE against the PP. In the following decade, how-
ever, this strategic reversal, reinforced even more by Llamazares, greatly damaged the 
party, favouring the strengthening of the PSOE which, led by Zapatero, appeared to the 
electorate as the only leftish force able to replace the PP, going on to win the Spanish 
elections of 2004 and 2008. 
The IU itself, following the disappointing results of the 2008 elections, concluded 
that it was the decision to support the Zapatero government that had «diluted its own 
political profile» projecting the image of a party subordinate to the political strategy of 
the government (IU 2008). It was only with the election of 2011 that IU started to grow 
again, and its success is closely linked to the decline of the PSOE, determined mainly by 
the effects of «economic voting». In fact, the PSOE, which led the government from 
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2004 until 2011, was severely punished by the electorate (in the elections of 2011 it 
recorded its worst election result with 29% of votes) for two main reasons: for having 
initially denied the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008 and having subsequently 
adopted ineffective austerity measures, following pressure from the international and 
European institutions (Martín and Urquizu-Sancho 2012). At the 2011 elections IU re-
turned again to its opposition strategy to the PSOE, advancing proposals contrary to 
the austerity and oriented to respond to social needs, becoming a true left alternative, 
obtaining as much as 7% of the votes from the electorate disappointed with the PSOE 
(Ibidem). This strategy was later confirmed in the 2014 European elections when IU 
joined the Tsipras project, aimed at building a European left that can give centrality to 
social issues within European integration.  
The change of direction made by the party produced positive results in both elec-
tions (Table 2). However, its rise was limited by the presence of many other small par-
ties, not just the traditional regionalist forces, but also new players as, for example, the 
Union Progress and Democracy (UPyD) and the Equo Commitment-Q. The first party 
was born in 2007 and led by Rosa Diaz, former member of the PSOE, presented itself as 
a «progressive force» intercepting at the 2011 elections 4% of the votes of disappoint-
ed with socialist policies; the second one, formed by leftists, ecologists and Valencian 
nationalists, has been joined by many exiles of IU (Martín and Urquizu-Sancho 2012). In 
addition, during the 2014 European elections, the political force that most of all at-
tracted general attention was certainly Podemos (We can) which received 8% of the 
vote. This political formation, led by Pablo Iglesias and founded in 2014 in view of the 
European elections, is certainly one of the main IU challengers, considering that it is a 
new political force, far from the logic of the traditional parties, linked to the movement 
of Indignados and placed precisely in the radical left. 
 
 
5.2 SEL and strategic ambiguity 
 
If the IU strategy is closely linked to the PSOE, that of SEL cannot be analysed with-
out considering the relationship with the PD and the divisions between the radical left 
organizations. Following the failure of the governmental experiment that RC had expe-
rienced in the Prodi government in 2006, Vendola wanted to re-establish and join forc-
es of the left by overcoming the distinction between radical and reformist, in order to 
give life to a leftist party capable of governing. This original aspiration would have in-
fluenced constantly the strategy of SEL, its relationship with the PD and the other RLPs, 
particularly the Left Federation, the other heir of RC. In particular, the search for the 
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maximization of the votes and the fear of not appearing as a reliable partner in a coali-
tion of centre-left have repeatedly revealed the discrepancies between the narrative of 
Vendola and a "wait and see" strategy often subordinate to the goals and decisions of 
the PD.  
The contradictions between the «logic of identity» and the «strategic logic» have 
emerged mainly since the autumn of 2011 following the resignation of Berlusconi's 
government, the end of «fragmented or polarized bipartisanship» and the beginning of 
the phase of «stabilization from the top», with the formation of the Monti Government 
(Piana and Raniolo 2013). Compared to the government, SEL stood in opposition, criti-
cizing the economic policies as being too liberal and an expression of the prevalence of 
technocracy on politics. At the same time, however, the party has always tried to main-
tain and make deals with the PD, at the time one of the main actors of government ma-
jority together with the centre-right (Damiani 2013b). It is precisely because of this 
ambiguity in that period, despite the cartelization of the major parties, the departure 
of PD from a social-democratic project, that SEL has failed to occupy the empty space 
to the left.  
It is with the general election of 2013 that we witnessed the failure of the entire rad-
ical left, divided by personalisms and the inability to reach an agreement on a common 
program. In fact, although in 2013 more than 15% of Italian voters placed themselves 
on the left of the ideological spectrum (in 2008 they were just over 10%) (Segatti 
2013), SEL got 3.2%, gaining access to the Parliament only because it was in coalition 
with the PD, while the Left Federation was left without representation. Also in this oc-
casion SEL tried to present itself as different from the other parties and in favour of 
«good policy», focused on the direct and widespread participation of citizens and the 
sobriety of politics (Sel 2013). However, its participation in the coalition of centre-left 
and the proximity to the old parties, perceived by the electorate as an expression of 
the First Republic (Segatti, 2013), have  pre-empted the renewal program of the party. 
This in light of a new political  challenger, the Five Star Movement, which placed itself 
as a real alternative to the cast and the "partitocrazia", focusing its own policy pro-
posals on direct participation and getting votes by both the output array of the right 
and the left (ibidem), arriving at obtaining 25.5% of the vote.  
Once the 2013 Legislature started, SEL moved to the opposition of the government 
led by the PD, first by Letta and later by Renzi, next to the 5 Star Movement and the 
Northern League. The reasons for the conversion strategy are to be found according to 
the party in the continuity of the governments of the broad agreements, in which the 
centre-left and centre-right again converge, with the previous experience of the tech-
nicians and the European austerity trend (Sel 2014). However once again, in a period 
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dominated by the de-politicization of the competition and with political agendas 
shared by both the centre-right and the centre-left, SEL lost the opportunity to act as 
the representative of the left, falling in internal strategic divisions. The internal dis-
putes became evident in occasion of the 2014 European elections when in front of the 
decision of the majority of SEL delegates to participate in the Tsipras List, some mem-
bers abandoned the party because inclined to support the European Socialists Party 
and to tighten the cooperation with the PD that, led by Renzi, obtained 40.1% of votes 
(Marchianò 2014).  
On this basis, it is possible to draw a reflection. Unlike IU which over the years has 
alternated between two strategies against the PSOE: opposition and collaboration, SEL 
has never been able to adopt a clear and unambiguous strategy, fighting between an 
original identity tending to the pole of the radical left and a cooperation strategy with 
the PD needed to occupy government positions. However, it is precisely the uncertain-
ty in the choice and adaptation to the political line of the PD that has prevented SEL 
from becoming the main contact for the left in recent years. 
 
 
5.3 SYRIZA and the antagonist project  
 
From 1981 until 2012 the Greek party system functioned according to bipartisan 
mechanics, in which two parties – Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) for the cen-
tre-left and New Democracy (ND) for the centre-right - alternated in government. 
However with the 2012 elections there was a reversal of the political balance and the 
subsequent formation of a «polarized two-partism» that SYRIZA became a key player 
(Dinas and Rori 2013). The electoral surge of SYRIZA was determined mainly by two 
factors: the decline of PASOK and the ability of the party itself to  formulate an antago-
nist policy, according to a strategy of opposition to the dominant parties.  
The beginning of the decline of PASOK came shortly after the start of its government 
following the early elections of 2009, when the crisis of the Greek economy became 
public knowledge, causing the intervention of the Troika and the imposition of the aus-
terity measures aimed to reduce the public debt according to the so-called Memoran-
dum. The loss of legitimacy and the increasing criticism of other parties and protests of 
citizenship were caused by different factors: the inability of the socialist government to 
address the crisis and to limit the disastrous social consequences; the difficulty in im-
plementing the austerity measures; the distance between the programme presented 
during the election campaign of 2009, focused on expansionary policies; and the risk 
feared by the main European leaders of the exit of Greece from the Eurozone (Dinas 
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and Rori 2013; Kosmidis 2013). So as a result of two government reshuffles and failed 
attempts to create a coalition government with ND, the Socialist Prime Minister Pa-
pandreou resigned, paving the way for a  government led by former ECB vice-president 
Papademos, supported this time also by ND.  
This would last until 2012. In these elections SYRIZA campaigned in favour of the 
public debt renegotiation and opposition to the Memorandum and to the main political 
parties, PASOK and ND, united on the need to implement reforms imposed by the EU 
and basically the perpetrators of irresponsible management of the country. The pro-
gramme presented by the party stood out for presenting concrete alternatives to the 
policies already implemented, focusing on the need to respect the «dignity» of the 
Greek people. It is no coincidence that 38% of the voters of SYRIZA claimed to have 
voted for it because it «expresses the demands for change» (Spourdalakis 2013). 
In both elections of May 2012 and those held soon after in June 2012, SYRIZA re-
ceived many votes of disillusioned Socialist party voters, beating the latter also in many 
of its traditional strongholds, recording the best results in the cities (Borreca 2014).  
The advantage of SYRIZA over the KKE, which is also contrary to the policies of aus-
terity and previous governments, was its greater ability to connect with the social 
movements and protest and with the younger generation (the party received the con-
sent of 45% of the electorate between 18 and 24 years) (Spourdalakis 2013), avoiding 
an hard Euroscepticism, and formulating a critical speech aimed to a radical change of 
the integration process (Borreca 2014). This internationalist orientation was then led 
by the party in the European elections of 2014, when Tsipras tried to mobilize all the 
radical left forces in European countries, gaining international exposure. 
It must be said, that these achievements are the result of a work that the party has 
led since 2004 when, as we have seen in the previous section, it became representative 
of the dissatisfaction and impatience of the Greek population. Already in the general 
election of 2007, SYRIZA had increased its electoral support going from 3.3% in 2004 to 
5%, benefiting even then from the crisis that had hit PASOK. This latter, in fact, over 
years moved away from the social representation,  coming closer to an electoralist 
model (Vernardakis 2012). 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
At the end of the comparison between IU, SEL and SYRIZA it is possible to of-
fer some concluding remarks. The three parties have submitted rather similar 
proposals to overcome the economic crisis and all of them were born as organi-
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zations open to internal participation and oriented to establish strong links with 
the society. However, in pursuing these purposes, each of them has adopted 
various strategies that have given rise to different organizational structures and 
more or less positive results in terms of internal cohesion, political consensus, 
roots in society and in the territory, especially in terms of capacity of attraction 
during the recent anti-austerity protests. 
IU has approached the model of the network parties encountering however 
many obstacles resulting from internal conflicts and the difficulty in establishing 
solid links with the outside world; SEL despite being born as a movement party 
led by a charismatic leader, with the passing of years, reduced its ability to mo-
bilize, falling in internal divisions; SYRIZA, despite coming from an earlier party, 
has been able to connect with the needs of society, establishing itself as a mass 
movement party and enjoying the guidance of a media-attractive leader. 
In addition the comparison between the three cases has shown that these 
parties were able to achieve better results when, in front of the weakness of 
the main social democratic parties, they have adopted strategies of opposition 
by presenting themselves as antagonistic forces, featuring a well-defined identi-
ty of the left. Over the last few years, IU has stopped its decline, opposing itself 
to bipartisanship and distancing itself from the policies adopted by previous 
governments led by PSOE; SYRIZA has become the second political force in 
Greece by proposing an alternative plan to the austerity measures adopted by 
Socialist and coalition governments; SEL instead, has been shown to receive 
popular support when, while cooperating with the PD, it has tried to distinguish 
itself through a renovation project of the Left (eg. Primaries in some municipali-
ties). Certainly the presence of antagonistic forces such as Podemos or Com-
mitment-Q in Spain, and the 5 Star Movement in Italy, may weaken their ability 
to act as the main reference for the resistance to the crisis. However, it is well 
to remember that IU, SEL and SYRIZA, compared with new movements or pro-
test parties have an identity based on some ideological principles that, in some 
ways, keep them away from a populist drift. 
In conclusion, in this phase of economic decline, characterized by the emer-
gence of deep social inequalities, there are good prospects for a radical left 
which is able to propose brave and alternative projects to the dominant model, 
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connecting with the needs and social demands, performing their main function, 
the social representation. 
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